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Giving a voice to Eurosceptic MEPs in the European
Parliament is an important part of making the integration
process more legitimate.
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While Eurosceptic parties at the national level have received significant attention from
political scientists, Euroscepticism within the EU’s own institutions has generally been
overlooked. Nathalie Brack uses role theory to assess the experiences of Eurosceptic
MEPs in the European Parliament, finding that they can broadly be situated into three
distinct categories: absentees, public orators, and pragmatists. She argues that far from
being a problem for European integration, the presence of Eurosceptic MEPs actually has
the potential to increase the legitimacy of the integration process by giving a voice to public
opposition.
Euroscepticism has become an integral part of  the polit ical landscape in Europe, both at the national and
supranational levels. It has attracted signif icant attention as European elections have provided
Eurosceptic parties with an opportunity to get parliamentary representation. But if  there is a rich
literature on the Eurosceptic stances of  these parties, there remains relatively lit t le research on these
actors and their behaviours once inside the European Parliament (EP). This article aims theref ore to
understand the strategies developed by Eurosceptic actors at the supranational level. It f ocuses on
members of  the Eurosceptic group Europe of  Freedom and Democracy (in the 7th legislature of  the EP),
of  its predecessor, the Independence and Democracy group, as well as on Eurosceptic representatives
f rom the radical right (6th and 7th legislatures). These actors are representatives of  f ringe right-wing
parties, sharing an opposition to the EU and/or European integration primarily f or polit ical and cultural
reasons. They are at the heart of  an interesting paradox: their greatest electoral successes have
occurred in elections to an institution they oppose and having taken their seats, they are obliged to
operate within it, which can pose an existentialist dilemma f or them.
Drawing on the motivational approach of  role theory, the article demonstrates that f acing similar
institutional constraints, Eurosceptic MEPs can be categorised in 3 types of  roles. More precisely, the
qualitative analysis of  the interviews with MEPs, of  their parliamentary activit ies and of  the observation
of  group meetings shows that these MEPs display a variety of  strategies and perceptions of  their
European mandate that can be summarised in a typology of  three roles: the Absentee, the Public Orator
and the Pragmatist.
The f irst is the role of  the Absentee. It is
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The f irst is the role of  the Absentee. It is
characterised by two main elements:
comparatively limited involvement inside the
parliament and emphasis on the national arena
and the voters. Although minimal involvement is
not restricted solely to Eurosceptics, a lack of
involvement has a specif ic meaning in their
case and can ref lect another type of
representation in the EP. It can be motivated
either by a lack of  interest in the mandate, or
by an absolute ref usal to get involved in the
daily f unctioning of  the institution. While
Absentees may neglect the parliament, they
are very active at home. They f eel they are in a
permanent campaign to inf luence public
opinion at home against the EU. If  they are
motivated by such ideological considerations,
opportunistic and utilitarian considerations
also play an important role. Some Abstentees
can indeed be strongly motivated by the
benef its attached to the posit ion of  MEP
(immunity, income, access to the media, social
prestige) while others participate in EP
elections f or national polit ical considerations:
i.e. to take advantage of  an electoral system
that is more f avourable to small, marginalised
parties. The seat in the EP is then an
opportunity to get noticed at the national level
and gain some legit imacy while not being
involved in the EP. This role tends to be chosen by Eurosceptics hostile to the EU and the integration
process or by “intergovermentalist” MEPs.
The second role is the Public Orator. MEPs playing this role give priority to two aspects of  the mandate:
public speaking and the dissemination of  negative inf ormation on the EU. Public Orators see themselves
as being the only opposition speakers and their logic is to delegit imise the institution through public
speeches. But Public Orators think that it is also their duty to inf orm the public of  the decisions made by
the EU and their negative consequences. They have strong relations with the media and are always
available to answer questions f rom voters, journalists, and other actors. Their presence in the EP and its
bodies is conditioned partly by the satisf action of  making plenary speeches, but also by the need to
collect negative inf ormation on the EU and to know f rom the inside what is happening. This role tends to
be chosen by either Eurosceptics hostile to the EU and the integration process, or
intergovernementalists who see the EP as a usef ul f orum of  expression.
The last role is the Pragmatist. It is characterised by greater involvement in the daily work of  the EP, a
need to achieve results, and a tendency to respect the rules. Such Eurosceptics do not remain in sterile
opposition, but develop a dif f erent strategy, aiming to strike a balance between the promotion of  their
views and the pursuit of  concrete results. Theref ore, they develop a dual conception of  their mandate:
as Eurosceptics they see themselves as part of  the opposition to European integration, but as MEPs
they want to make a dif f erence. Two subgroups are distinguishable: the f irst one includes pragmatists
who conceive and carry out their mandate in order to amend and control, in specif ic areas, the init iatives
of  their f ellow MEPs and of  the other EU institutions. The second subgroup of  pragmatists is primarily
driven by the motivation to def end the national/regional interest in the chamber and solve the problems in
their country/region. They tend to adopt an instrumentalist approach as they use the assembly as a
f orum f or the advocacy of  national or specif ic interests that they cannot def end at the national level.
The role of  Pragmatist is primarily chosen by ref ormist Eurosceptics, who accept some limited and
institutionalised cooperation at the European level and concentrate their crit icism on the current state of
the EU.
Euroscepticism, especially in its outright f orm, remains rather marginal and has not had a direct impact on
policy outcomes. Euroscepticism would have to be much more widespread among elites to really have an
immediate impact on the workings of  the EU institutions. However this does not mean that the presence
of  Eurosceptics within the EP has no impact at all. Eurosceptics not only f acilitate discussions about the
limits of  the current integration process, but also raise key questions about the role of  the opposition in
a polit ical system like the EU, which relies on relatively depolit icised and consensual interactions. The
presence of  these dissenting voices could increase the representativeness of  the EP, and contribute
thereby to the legit imacy of  the European polity.
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